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Qualitative methodological development has produced canonical tendencies
that over-complexify and fix a fluid and lived social world. Meanwhile, critical
theory has produced critiques on methodology but without enough attention to
the qualitative tradition. I bridge these gaps by using an Adornoian position to
interrogate the concepts of systematicity, rigidification, complexification, and
their problems in ethnographic research and qualitative methodology. I conduct
an urban ethnography and autoethnography of the metropolitan blasé as a public
attitude of indifference to articulate an alternative, quotidian approach to
ethnography that better captures social embeddedness, meaning-creation, and
how contexts should drive data collection, analysis, and method-selection.
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Introduction
A Brief History of the Modern Tenets of Ethnography
In reaction to the sociological stance in the 1960s that argued the need for firm a priori
theoretical orientations, grounded theory methodology (GTM) posited the discovery of
concepts and hypotheses could occur after data collection, rather than before (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 1978). While GTM distinguished itself from ethnography by studying
the experience of a phenomenon, rather than its nature, both overlapped enough to propound
an inductive approach to data collection (Janesick, 1994, p. 223). This inductive approach to
conducting research has held firm in qualitative research practices throughout the years. Early
data collection in ethnography, participant observation, and GTM converge on the practice of
description: methods of data collection focus on thick description or the procurement and
regurgitation of as much information as possible (Geertz, 1973, pp. 9-10).
But today, this canonical practice in ethnographic research has adopted a new tendency.
Ethnographic analysis has been made systemizable by a consensus that qualitative fieldwork
data requires analysis and remodeling (Berg, 1998; Brewer, 2000). In the process, systematicity
has shifted our attention restrictively towards the proposed entwinement of data collection and
analysis characteristic of GTM (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 2; Glaser, 1978). Methodological
inquiries on the practice emphasize, for instance, the need for systematicity in ethnography in
order for it to be named a "proper science" (Aunger, 1995), but without critically evaluating
what it offers to improve ethnography. Similarly, ethnographers are also prompted to digest
data into "more sophisticated," integrated categories (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2001, p. 161), but
without assessing what emerges from such a complexified reality.
Recursivity is another tenet of ethnography, which essentially refers to how a
researcher’s findings and analyses during the course of a project actively feed back into their
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ideas and decisions about the project’s design and methodology (Davies & Dwyer, 2007). But
even though recursivity is deemed indispensable in ethnography, suggesting a bottom-up
approach to data collection and analysis, the processes of interpretation and writing fail to
escape systematicity in ways that betray a tendency to “over-complexify” the social world. In
doing so, the tendency toward systematicity abandons impressions by which sociological
reflections are made accessible—low-level nuances unamenable to theory, but crucial to the
creation of meaning per social embeddedness, garnered from a site. At the same time, the
abandonment of impressions encourages conceptual thinking—the practice of parceling
theories into concepts and applying them deductively (see Ivinson et al., 2011)—as part of the
current mainstream tradition of systematized ethnographic and qualitative inquiry. Thus, a
great deal is overlooked within these methodological developments, now accepted as canon in
ethnographic research practice. Rather than over-simplifying a complex and ambiguous social
reality, we are over-complexifying a situated and lived social world teeming with social
relations and meanings. We are deconstructing the world, before constructing it anew, and
fixing the fluidity of social life from the way we collect and analyze data through to how we
write our results (Au, 2018).
Problematizing the Modern Tenets of Ethnography: An Adornoian Approach
In this article, I flesh out how systematicity, rigidification, and complexification arise
in ethnographic research practice and writing. To this end, I draw upon critical social theory,
which has generated the most activity along this strand of thought, embroiled in overarching
critiques launched against positivist methodological approaches (Adorno et al., 1975; Mottier,
2005; Smith et al., 1996). Even within critical social theoretical engagements, however,
popularized attention to quantitative methods as positivism has overshadowed the importance
of interrogating positivist tendencies in qualitative methods.
Theodor Adorno, in particular, is credited with designing and propounding a staunchly
qualitative program of research concurrently with an indiscriminate attack on quantitative
approaches (Jung, 2013). This assertion is not without warrant. It gains credence from
Adorno’s praise for qualitative research as a "refined, discriminating" approach that produced
an "abundance of specific, concrete insights" and "detailed information" on individual cases
(Adorno, 2000/1968, p. 74), and again from his critique of quantitative research itself for the
criteria it adopted (Adorno, 2000/1968). Adorno further suggested, in accordance with his
"radically sociological" perspective (Benzer, 2011, p. 72) that the social whole could be
unearthed through minutiae, that the "seemingly individual" case or datum had "general
value"—that is, a smaller sample could still serve to uncover the wider social context of the
functions in question (Adorno, 2000/1968, p. 75). However, these assertions prescribe for
Adornoian thought a form of identity thinking he himself spited, failing to properly account for
Adorno’s fundamental negative position: non-identity thinking or "consciousness of nonidentity" (Adorno, 1973/1966, p. 17) immanent to negation to highlight "the impossibility of
capturing in subjective concepts without surplus what is not of the subject" (Adorno,
1982/1956, p. 147).
Thus, bringing scrutiny to bear on Adorno’s popularized disdain for quantitative
research, it emerges that it was the standards that quantitative agendas imposed on social
reality, and the hierarchical reorganization of its content, which Adorno rejected. These
standards included formalizing text items into "units" (Bauer, 2000, p. 133), in addition to
prioritizing the establishment of "mathematical stringency," "reliability," and "generalization"
as criteria and standards for research (Adorno, 2000/1968, p. 74). His indictments of
quantitative research further derived from an emphasis on the problems of various forms of
“method-guided research.” In method-guided research, method selection for social research is
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not modeled after phenomena but predetermined by ideologically held notions about the
universality of one form of method (Benzer, 2011, p. 56). Just as how it is “only a particular”
quality formed within quantitative research that Adorno rejects, it is “only a particular” quality
within qualitative research that he admires—the "qualitative richness of material [rather than
quantitative] reduction to as few categories as possible" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2006, p. 880).
Critiquing the Modern Tenets of Ethnography: Applying an Adornoian Approach to the
Blasé
Theoretically drawing on Adorno and methodologically using both ethnography and
autoethnography, this article examines the metropolitan blasé to performatively open dialogue
on systematicity, rigidification, and complexification as they appear with empirical
ethnographic research and writing practices, whilst charting a way forward to avoid these
problems. Autoethnography and ethnography have notable differences. Autoethnography is to
use the self to investigate the social, often involving the regular documentation of personal
experiences and reflections while one is a member of a group of interest (Hayano, 1979; Taber,
2010). On the other hand, ethnography is to investigate the social with a stronger focus on
documenting the relational practices, interactions, and dialogue of the group, while minimizing
the focus on intrapersonal emotions of the self insofar as the self is conceived as a tool (a
participant observer) to gain access to the group (Ellis et al., 2011).
However, as Leon Anderson (2006) observes, as autoethnography became more
popular over the past several decades, its practices began to take after the mainstream
ethnographic paradigm, such as becoming a “full member in the research group or setting” (p.
375) and being “visible as… a member in the researcher’s published texts” (Anderson, 2006,
p. 375). As a result, there has been a growing “blur” of the boundaries between the two (see
also Atkinson, 2006), by which calls have been made to treat autoethnography as an ipso facto
part of ethnography (Taber, 2010).
Although more critical styles of autoethnography have recently come forth (Atkinson,
2006), for the purposes of this article, the critiques I make will refer to the style of
autoethnography whose boundaries are “blurred” and take after that of mainstream
ethnography. Furthermore, I will be conducting both autoethnography and ethnography. Given
the psychological foundations of the subject matter (the metropolitan blasé), the combination
of both autoethnography and ethnography is particularly useful, as will be demonstrated.
The metropolitan blasé has gone completed neglected by social theory and sociological
research for its superficiality as a concept—its apparent lack of theoretical depth. Originally
described by Georg Simmel (1976/1903) as an attitude of general indifference, the blasé is
theorized to arise as a natural psychological response to the mass stimulation that metropolitan
environments emotionally generate through media and the co-presence of others:
The psychological foundation, upon which the metropolitan individuality is
erected, is the intensification of emotional life due to the swift and continuous
shift of external and internal stimuli... Lasting impressions, the slightness in
their differences, the habituated regularity of their course and contrasts
between them, consume, so to speak, less mental energy than the rapid
telescoping of changing images, pronounced differences within what is
grasped at a single glance, and the unexpectedness of violent stimuli ... the
metropolis creates these psychological conditions—with every crossing of the
street, with the tempo and multiplicity of economic, occupational and social
life ... (Simmel, 1976/1903, pp. 409-410, italics added)
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Thus, the blasé is an indispensable social process for study, given its constitution of social
reality and contexts that we experience continuous immediacy with. Further, it is this very
quality—of being superficial—that makes it the ideal topic with which to contextualize a
dialogue between Adornoian negative position and problems with contemporary ethnographic
methodological practice and writing. The blasé as an ephemeral, superficial, yet universal
routine of metropolitan life cannot be fleshed out with conventional ethnographic research
practice and analysis, and instead requires the use of a quotidian approach. A quotidian
approach is most suitable as it is grounded on formulating impressions, brushes with social
reality, that could access the “out-of-the-way details,” “lasting impressions,” and minutiae of
everyday life that comprise the blasé. Adopting such a quotidian approach to study the blasé
thus draws attention to variation in details as a simplifying manipulation (Adorno, 2000/1968,
p. 84), opening dialogue on the problems of insensitivity to social reality and complexification
of data, and reimagining this dialogue with Adornoian thought.
The Objectives of the Article
Against these backdrops, my core aim is to underscore the significance of the
relationship between method selection and the research context, rather than the relationship
between data collection and analysis/theory like in GTM. That is, in empirical research, the
selection of methods should proceed from the context of a research topic, as opposed to the
reverse: method-guided research cannot exhaust empirical social research. I first tease out and
critically engage with practices now deemed standard in ethnographic and qualitative practice
and writing: systematicity, rigidified data collection and analysis, case studies, the constant
comparative method, thinking in terms of concepts, and organizing findings into narratives. I
then show how they alter and distort social reality through systematicity, rigidification, and
complexification. Throughout, I set up a quotidian approach as a new means of conducting and
interpreting qualitative research that best explores social reality without distorting it. A
quotidian approach relies on “impressions” that illuminate the social embeddedness of situated
contexts, and its application in a combined autoethnographic and ethnographic study of the
blasé as an ephemeral, poorly understood, yet undeniably present quality in social life. Next, I
detail the public squares in London selected as field sites for my study of the blasé, after which
I analyze my findings to make sense of the blasé as a metropolitan phenomenon itself, and to
explore the merits of a quotidian approach versus a rigidified and systematized research
agenda.
There is much theoretical uncertainty that clouds (i) the nature of the blasé, taken to be
a default public attitude of indifference in cities. This, in turn, is bound up in (ii) an uncertainty
about how indifference actually emerges from the overstimulation wrought by metropolitan
environments. I address these inquiries concerning the nature of the blasé by focusing on and
exploring three empirical questions: how is the blasé manifested and operated within a public
space? Under what conditions does the blasé break? What does this mean in terms of
indifference in metropolitan city life? Finally, I discuss the implications of this article for
interpreting Adornoian thought on qualitative methodology and its insights for future design
and practice in qualitative and ethnographic research and the particular vision of social reality
constructed and interpreted in the process.
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Re-Evaluating the Tenets of Data Interpretation
The Constant Comparative Method and Inflexible Thought
A constant comparative method of data analysis prescribes rigid strategies for coding
and making sense of data in ways that push analysis toward procedural thinking. The predetermination of three sets of coding—open, axial, selective (Corbin & Strauss, 2008)—urges
the parceling, systematization, and hierarchical reorganization of social reality into
homogenized parts conformed to a rigidized coding paradigm. This logic diagram is consisted
of "identifying a central category about the phenomenon, exploring categories of conditions
that influence the phenomenon, the actions or interactions that result from the central
phenomenon, the conditions that influence the strategies, and the outcomes of the strategies"
(Robson, 2011, p. 149).
Bearing this in mind, ethnographic recursivity—the shuttling between the use of
predefined coding categories for analysis and developing newly identified codes for analysis
(LeCompte & Schensul, 2013)—becomes a process of fitting observations into categories
predetermined by theory. Like the constant comparative method, the only promise of flexibility
(induction) that truly remains is the slight re-purposing of the original theoretical categories to
accommodate for "anomalies" (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1978; Popper, 1963).
In a similar vein, thought must not follow a deductive chain, must consistently interrupt
itself, and must return to the smallest of phenomena in order to decrypt empirical phenomena
from within. The reverse, confronting them with measures from without would ultimately
distort them (Adorno, 1998/1963, 1969, pp. 28, 32-34). For these reasons, the promise for
capturing slight details held by mass description (Becker, 1998, p. 83) is unraveled by its
coupling with recursivity (Becker, 1998, p. 85). Despite recursivity’s promise of realizing the
dialogical ideals of reflexive science—between the virtual and the real, the observer and the
participant, local and extralocal forces, and the development of theory—it deductively imposes
theory on research data. In this manner, it mortgages the method's potential to fully grasp the
intricacies of social phenomena. That is, recursivity only resembles constant self-interruption.
But any analysis that reconstitutes parcels of information into a hierarchy of themes exclude
the slightest of phenomena that are otherwise crucial to relatable picture of social reality.
Moreover, thought that beckons the deductive irruption of theory forecloses possibilities of
understanding phenomena from within—with the intimacy of a situated context. The procedure
is redolent of a trend in early twentieth century aesthetics, tending to "form general synthetic
concepts on the basis of only a few characteristics... of a school, a period, etc., then to proceed
by deduction from these generalizations to the analysis of individual phenomena" (Lukacs,
1971, p. 13). Recursive and constant comparative analysis, then, do unto their data what
aesthetics did to artwork: forcing their subjects "into a conceptual straitjacket" and "distor[ting]
them" (Lukacs, 1971, p. 13).
Narrative Organization and Systematicity: Considering a Quotidian Approach
This hierarchical reorganization of data into a narrative complexifies, rather than
simplifies, social reality, for three reasons: (1) the global theme that emerges from analysis,
though cloaked in a deceptively simple form, is the product of a series of abuses and distortions
of social reality. A global theme is but the result of data broken down into codes and subcodes
(Brewer, 2000, p. 111). (2) That is, analysis within recursivity proposes the same procedures
to different problems, which essentially reduce the phenomena to units or "breaks up" things
into smaller parts and explaining the whole in terms of relations between the parts (Robson,
2011, p. 412). The danger here, painting a more complex picture of social reality, lies in the
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schematic reconstruction of relationships and individuals into formalized units. Here, every
relationship becomes defined by the same indicators and criteria, shifting attention away from
the differences in their social contexts. (3) The reorganization of social reality to form an
overarching narrative is arbitrarily decided by a researcher arriving from the outside.
Researchers fashion social phenomena into narratives using abstract social theoretical
presuppositions. That people in my fieldwork only joined in to watch dancers when others had
already begun to do so would look upon the event in terms of in-group homophily designed
into a space by city planners. (4) In the same breath, then, people are transformed from subjects
into objects, where their actions are reframed as expressions of an abstract theory. Thus,
theoretical deduction necessarily overshadows (any defense for) personal agency. The dangers
of this position are found in social estrangement: the social world we occupy—and now, even
our actions—are made foreign, no longer recognizable to us (Adorno, 1967/1955, p. 69),
producing a "de facto reified, solidified, integrated society exempted from individual
resistance" (Benzer, 2011, p. 38). Within such a world, phenomena become treated by the
researchers and researched alike as immutable, a point to be taken up further later.
Mistaking these admonitions for an attempt to excommunicate theory altogether would
be fatal, for sociological insight depends on "theoretically analyzing empirical materials"
(Benzer, 2011, p. 78). Moreover, none of the admonitions against unsystematicity alter the
caveat that observations and facts are untrustworthy, since they are always subjectively
reconstructed (Adorno, 1975/1955, p. 185). Taking observations without filtering them
ultimately reifies the social relations between subjects of study, failing to assess how these
relations condition individual subjective opinions. The practice culminates, once more, in
social estrangement. It is here that theoretical analysis is key to resolving the untrustworthiness
of subjectively reconstructed facts.
Indeed, reflexive science aims to circumvent the issues aforementioned by orienting
itself around dialogical ideals, all of which push toward a development of theory constituted of
a dialogue between theory and itself (Burawoy, 1998). The employ of theory, for Burawoy, is
to be treated as "not only... dialogue between participant and observer, but also among
observers now viewed as participants in a scientific community" (p. 16). The dialogue of theory
between researchers and researched would augment both parties' reflexivity, shedding light on
the conscious and unconscious motivations behind subjective reconstructions of observations.
Furthermore, since recursivity entrusts theory to the researcher alone, it forces ethnography
into the model of positive science by creating “distance” between researchers and researched
and insulating the former from the latter (p. 28). The formation of categories represents topdown theorization during data collection, which injects detachment into our existing forms of
engagement. This detachment inevitably produces biases, as the theories we draw on influence
us to look for details that best reflect them and dismiss details irrelevant to them—details which
could otherwise produce a clearer, comprehensive picture of a social phenomenon.
Yet, what is the "comprehensive whole" of a social phenomenon? While no isolated
sensuous data exists to which one can point and say "voila—that is society" (Adorno,
2000/1968, p. 35), there are situations where society can be "[felt] on one's skin" in individual
moments. It is these situations of proximity between individuals and their social context that
enable "preliminary, poor, but sociologically relevant, perceptions of the whole" (Adorno,
2000/1968, p. 49).
A quotidian approach is grounded on this premise. It relies upon, and so sensitizes
researchers, to recording, accounting for, and analyzing impressions or quotidian encounters
that can be "felt" in tiny stretches of time within a setting. That impressions allow us to "feel"
society is not idle philosophical language. It strongly resonates with the quality of social or
relational content of embeddedness (DiMaggio, 1992) and the embeddedness of meanings in
networked spaces (Lamont, 2000). In other words, impressions give access to nuanced
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understandings of how we come to be influenced by social relations, and by extension, how we
produce meaning, within a given setting. Furthermore, impressions carry analytic value by
better enabling the inspection of protentions within the same tiny stretches of time that they
occur—conceptual acts of perpetually re-assessing action based on immediate influences in a
social setting, per action theories (Mische, 2009).
Thus, these impressions or personal, quotidian encounters offer three interrelated
advantages over predetermined methods: (1) by refusing the application of predetermined
devices, we can circumvent the problems of method-driven research (like systematicity) and
apply methods and knowledge production specific to the social context of interest (Benzer,
2011, p. 77). In doing so, researchers acquire a proximity and immediacy to the empirical
content of different phenomena. Social analysis, after all, requires its saturation with factual
content. (2) Primary confrontations with social life "offers initial glimpses of the social whole
that sociology is ultimately concerned with" (Benzer, 2011, p. 77). The prescient awareness
behind impressions (Adorno, 2000/1968, pp. 36-37) or intuition generated from an initial
encounter with a social phenomenon cannot be underestimated nor separated from
unsystematicity. The utility of quotidian insights in uncovering "a social whole" presupposes a
position where deep, penetrating insights of the social layers of a phenomenon are quotidian in
the first place. This lays the foundation for impressions as units of analysis—immediate, yet
close encounters that require researchers to feel, before they think, as a data collection tool. (3)
Impressions offer two further methodological improvements to fieldwork investigations of
social settings: (a) they allow us into the minutiae and cultural milieu of a social environment,
its occupant social relations, how these relations produce and interpret meaning with members
and their social environment. And in doing so, (b) they enable a finer level of analysis to
understand how individuals, as they are influenced by social relations, coordinate and enact
their actions in the field.
The methodological implications of a quotidian approach center on the complete
integration of a researcher into a social environment. But qualitative fieldwork admonishes
against this position or "going native" and the risks it entails, in this case, the researcher always
loses the ability to observe, due to overidentification with members (Gold, 1958). This
tendency, however, is overstated, for the assertion that opinions dispensed by in-group
members are somehow disassociated from analytic reflection would simultaneously extend to
discredit interviews. It could just as easily be argued that the social reality depicted by
interviewees' reflections are without analysis and thus, always inaccurate—which is,
obviously, untrue. What may be anticipated from "going native," though, is the adoption of a
structured set of biases that impedes sociological analysis by introducing selective data
collection (Robson, 2011, p. 328). However, this is ultimately no different than how deductive
theory in recursivity aborts potential layers of social reality by dismissing details.
Indeed, key distinctions can be drawn between these two processes of developing biases
that throw into sharp relief the errors behind the "going native" judgment. (1) Biases from
deductive theory extend beyond collection to breach the realm of interpretation. The premature
judgments deductive theory summons within us during data collection are carried with us till
writing, publication, and beyond, distorting social reality in irreversible ways. Biases from
"going native," by contrast, can begin and end with participation in the field. In other words,
"going native" makes us see an environment like native occupants would. The only things this
position would blindside us to are perspectives informed by distant, theoretical lenses. Doing
so, however, would better allow us into the social embeddedness of a space, feeling the
impressions that emerge, and understanding meaning-production within these spaces. In stark
contrast, deductive theory, or the commonly suggested distant researcher-participant role (or
"going researcher") would blindside us to perspectives held among native occupants. Thus,
whereas "going native" would shape our criteria for recording observations with a lean towards

1168

The Qualitative Report 2021

social embeddedness, "going researcher" would shape our observations with a predilection
towards theory and higher levels of abstraction. And when we depart the field to reflect on our
notes, we would discover that observations generated by "going native" concern intimate, even
mundane, details that paint a closer picture of the social environment. On the other hand, those
generated by "going researcher" would be preoccupied with premature judgments about
meaning and social relations, calloused attempts to generalize it across other contexts, and
ultimately a shallow understanding of the site and its people.
(2) In a similar vein, the selective data collection driven by "going native" would likely
uncover details significant to a social phenomenon and its environment. That is, because "going
native" would mean becoming an in-group member, then they would be more likely to produce
quotidian insights. As a result, what we decide to record and observe become closer
approximations of what fellow in-group members would also deem important—more so than
if we recorded details according to propositions of an abstract theory articulated outside the
environment of interest. Thus, which roles researchers are to adopt should be flexibilized. We
should “shuttle between” different roles, at varying levels of participation during fieldwork
within a single social setting (Au, 2017) to allow for proximity. It is in drawing closer, not
farther, that we can appreciate the nuances ignored between the cracks by researchers that leave
impressions upon us. Impressions can be signs and parts of meanings created within the social
relations, which are invested in a social setting that does not exist in isolation, but as a situated
part of society.
Ethnographic Writing and Relationality
Writing can also realize the aforementioned tendencies by reifying what might
otherwise be fluid, subjective, relational qualities of an ethnographic excursion. Reification,
according to Adorno, consists of the presentation of social relations as "being[s]-in-itself"
(1967/1955, p. 69). The presentation of research, explaining the selection of participants and
framing your position and narrative (Wolcott, 1990), accomplishes this in two ways:
(1) When you write about your positions according to typologies of observer roles, the
conclusions of your reflexivity are predetermined, and as are its constrictions. Defining your
positionality in terms of complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant,
or complete observer (Gold, 1958) and complete-member-researcher, active-memberresearcher, peripheral- or member-researcher (Adler & Adler, 1994, pp. 379-380) reifies these
stages in participation, forcing conformity to characteristics of engagement allowed within
each stage. A defense for the "overlap" that exists between these stages is insufficient. To
illustrate its dangers, consider Whyte’s (1943) extensive, classic study of the social structures
within the stigmatized Cornerville. Cornerville was commonly and publicly seen as financially
poor, plagued by mental health problems, and altogether burdened with every social stigma
imaginable at the time. But, as Whyte’s (1943) ethnography reveals, there are layers of social
structures at work that coordinate and shape behaviors and actions among its residents—
structures with characteristics unique to Cornerville, but which could be found anywhere else.
To explore this dynamic, Whyte essentially inducted himself into a local gang, and recorded
the transformations in the group over time, all the while participating in their activities.
(2) Writing about a social environment, particularly one in which its boundaries
converge with those of an institution, expresses another kind of reification that concerns the
community of study itself. Framing the findings of an ethnographic or participant observational
study within a community without extending beyond its context narrows the locus of research.
What results is a sense of exclusive specificity to your findings that betrays the imperative of
sociological analysis to understand society. Specificity is thus imparted onto the presentation
of a study through constrictive framing, restricting the relevance of research findings to the
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conditions of a particular community. In terms borrowed from the sociology of knowledge, this
invites conceptual thinking or micro-theory, rather than theoretical thinking or big theory
(Ivinson & Davies, 2011).
For instance, Das and Das' (2007) study of illness among the urban poor is framed, as
many studies are, as an application of concepts. The concept of illness narrative, at best, enjoys
a repositioning within the limits of their ethnographic fieldwork. However, it nevertheless
comes short of an engagement with the role of illness as the node between culture and political
economy in “organized systems” of concepts or big theory. Indeed, Ivinson and Davies (2011)
note:
[the] growing recognition that, once again, we need big thinking using big
theoretical ideas in working on local problems … [which] provides immense
resources for thinking ourselves out of crisis because, in contradistinction to
micro-theory, we are able to contemplate global transformations in ways
which otherwise would remain unthinkable. (p. i)
Thus, conceptual thinking is engaged in a dialectical relationship with the deductive application
of theory. So long as the crux of ethnographic research and its presentation is preoccupied with
“concepts,” theory will remain positioned to enter research by irruption in deductive forms.
Social research studies, in their disjunctions, will remain consisted of piecemeal efforts that
attempt—and fail—to enhance our understanding of society.
The promise of the case study as a mode of ethnography (Robson, 2011, p. 146) is
insufficient to stymie this problem. It is not enough that an ethnographic site be remodeled as
a "case" of a larger class of similar cases. This framing is only concerned with one theoretical
construct—the skeleton on which all other cases are flesh. It still falls short on understanding
the broader society in which these cases are located. In her ethnographic study of advocacy
after Bhopal, Kim Fortun (2001), recounts how she purportedly could not study Bhopal for its
own sake or confine its understandings to it alone if it were to have sociological significance.
She aimed instead to describe, through Bhopal, specific mechanisms "that connect
geographically dispersed actors and that grant these actors differential possibilities for working
well within these systems" (p. 7). These, in turn, were undergirded by an attempt to understand
how "historical perspective is built into law, policy, bureaucratic initiative, civic action, and
commercial endeavor" (p. 7). The principles Fortun purported to uncover were not about
Bhopal or even some larger class of similar cases that it might be taken to represent. Rather,
they were about processes that make up and are buried in a situated context part of the social
fabric of society—processes drawn from and which feed the lived world beyond the research,
and all the boxes it comes to be packaged in by researchers.
Methods and Context
The nature of the metropolitan blasé demanded unconventional modifications to
ethnographic practices in my methodological approach. Chief among them included my role in
the field, which was, and coincidentally the only one available within this project, a participantas-observer (Adler & Adler, 1994). In this role, I would observe the daily interactions and
surface-level engagements among all occupants and passersby of these urban spaces. Second,
the methodological approach was purely ethnographic observation. I did not take initiative to
seek interaction with other occupants or passersby. This better replicated the indifferent
attitudes of the blasé for my own experience—to carefully bring upon myself those same forms
of socialization open and foreclosed to local passersby subject to and who demonstrate the
blasé. In doing so, autoethnography became an integral mode of analysis that further
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accommodated for the interplay of my self-engaged with "cultural descriptions mediated
through ethnographic explanation" (Ellis, 2003, p. 38; see also Ellis et al., 2011). More
importantly, autoethnography constituted a mode of reflexivity (Landy et al., 2016) through
which symbolic meanings represented by the actions and conditions that mediate the blasé can
be measured against my own interpretations and participation experience (Au, 2017).
For my field sites, I chose to visit Piccadilly Circus and Leicester Square in the city
core of London. Located in the heart of Soho, a popular entertainment and nightlife district,
these two sites were the largest public squares in London that regularly attracted many visitors,
passersby, locals, and tourists, every other day for a duration of two months. During each site
visit, I would spend between three and five hours sitting and documenting my observations at
various locations. I made an effort to remain mobile within a site, shuttling between different
locations, so as to not attract suspicion by remaining in one place. The first site, Piccadilly
Circus, is close to major entertainment areas in the West End of London and notable buildings
that include the London Pavilion and Criterion Theatre, among others. Bracketed with glowing
neon signs and home to the Shaftesbury memorial fountain, the circle regularly attracts hosts
of tourists and locals alike as a major traffic junction and popular meeting place. People often
perch atop the steps of the fountain: some of them alone, others in company; some of them
eating, others in conversation. The second site, Leicester Square, is a pedestrianized square
nested amidst strings of a variety of restaurants and the London Chinatown. Two
interconnected areas comprise the Square: a garden area and a street area, both of which are
partially bordered by an elevated lawn and a stone ledge leaning towards the latter. From the
center of the garden, the Shakespeare fountain overlooks a ring of benches teeming with
wanderers, passersby, and litters of pigeons. The street area is even busier. A river of people
flowing through the street from Covent Garden, Piccadilly Circus, and Chinatown—with
Leicester Square at their intersection—is a common picture from midday onwards. Brilliant
rainbows of light rain upon the crowds from a neighboring multi-level candy store (called
"M&M World") on the north side of the street, before which caricature artists offer seats to
passersby interested in self-portraits. A police vehicle can often be found across the store, with
a lone officer standing in front of the van, sweeping the river of passersby, wordlessly.
Interrupting this mass of people at the edges of the Square are street performers, largely young
men and women who sing and promote recordings of their work, play music, dance, clap, and
perform stand-up comedy. These sites provided the ideal environments—metropolitan areas
inundated with both people and media—with which to unearth the conditions that break the
blasé, and, by extension, the conditions that facilitate its construction.
This method selection anticipates criticism on several accounts, which I will attempt to
address here. First, my decision to not conduct interviews invites a charge of insensitivity to
norms, habitus, taste, and behaviors ingrained in individuals from cultural backgrounds. These
elements, it may be said, mediate individuals’ interpretations of the blasé, perhaps even in more
complex and fragmented ways for the global tourists who visit London. But to study the blasé
does not require a penetration into such norms. An analogy would make clear the qualities
encompassed by and level of abstraction associated with the blasé. If we were to imagine a
restaurant, the blasé would not be what individuals order, how they order, what they converse
about, or even how they sit, but with how they hold a fork. That is, how the practice of holding
a fork is universal within all restaurants of a certain class, how it is effortless to adopt through
mimesis, yet how imperceptible it remains within this setting. The conditions that facilitate this
universality, adoptability, and imperceptibility which exemplify the blasé are what must be
studied. The blasé, after all, is hypothesized to simply be a default attitude of indifference in a
city—something universal, yet difficult to see.
Second, it invites the charge of failing to spend enough time in the field. By the end of
the two months of my field participation, I discontinued attendance to circumvent the issue of
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being recognized by local vendors and performers. Also, I achieved saturation with the themes
I uncovered in the research data—people repeatedly demonstrated the same tendencies,
supporting the same conclusions and a structuration of practices that was now visible.
Moreover, as aforementioned, interacting with individuals would break the blasé in ways
unnatural to the practices and schemas of the urban spaces. By becoming another individual—
a participant-as-observer—under the influence of the blasé, I augmented my ability to construct
an autoethnographic account.
Examining the Field
Maintaining the Blasé: Non-Participation and "Watchedness"
At Leicester Square, youth smoked on the stone ledge bordering the park, looked at
their phones, stared into the distance, or watched one of the neighboring street performers.
When in the company of two or more, individuals appeared more relaxed. They engaged in
conversation amongst themselves, and rather than staring into the distance, they looked at
specific people in the crowds, following with them with their eyes and turning their heads. It
appears, therefore, that people do not watch others when alone, and only feel comfortable
enough to do so when in company. At Piccadilly Circus, people stood around the statue at a
distance, taking pictures and selfies; people near the statue were leaning on it but not sitting;
some people were eating; others were checking their phones, and smoking; again, people who
were in the company of others were busy chatting and appeared more consciously observant
(moving their heads more, staring at specific people rather than a general direction), compared
to those by themselves, who stared fixedly into the distance (in one-direction). Some people
passing by had their hands in their pockets, listening to music, not looking at others. On other
days, there were fewer people taking pictures and more people sitting down on the statue.
From these interactions, we can infer a new definition of blasé, from a default general
feeling of indifference in public: rather than the actual refusal to take in new information, it is
the need to appear to refuse to take in information. Although both produce the image of a
distant, uninterested person, they have several important differences. (1) Actual refusal to take
in new information implies a motivation drawn from physical environment and a personal
reaction to the multitude of others (i.e., too many people and too much to take in, so I close
myself off). By contrast, appearing to refuse to take in information implies a motivation drawn
from qualities of this multitude, becoming an emulation of others (i.e., too many people
uninterested, so I will habituate and produce the appearance of closing off). (2) The appearance
of closing off is easier to penetrate than closing off. (3) The appearance of closing off as an
emulation of others introduces a whole set of social norms governing what constitutes
acceptable behavior.
Measuring these interpretations against my own experience as I sat on the same ledge,
after a short amount of time, I felt a sense of awkwardness. I felt out of place and undesirable.
Public company or some activity seemed integral to a positive social image, and I, being by
myself, was falling short of this standard. I checked my phone in an attempt to dissuade the
inference that I was not doing anything. Being conscious of this feeling, I wondered what would
happen if I tried breaking the unspoken schema of eye-contact. When I was walking through
Leicester Square and Piccadilly Circus, I constantly made eye-contact with people without
looking away—all of them looked away, then darted back at me, then away again (before we
passed each other by); no one maintained consistent eye-contact. One woman passing by
glanced at my phone, noticing that I was jotting notes down on it, and shot me a suspicious
look, before walking off hurriedly. This gives credence to blasé as appearance, to which is
attached norms that center on appearing occupied (i.e., phones, music, staring) or ways that
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“nullify” our presence in public. It follows, therefore, that immersion in a densely populated
setting conditions its occupants with the feelings of “inescapability” and pervasive, constant
surveillance. Links can thus be drawn to my (and others') apparent fear of being seen as
unoccupied: the perception (and reality) of constant surveillance impress upon occupants of
urban spaces the need to remain occupied at all times. Through this, we constantly regulate our
performances and keep vigilant of the perceived stigma of loneliness as undesirable.
In front of “M&M World,” when people stopped walking, they engaged in the same
publicly atomizing activities (i.e., checking phones, etc.) and gravitated to the corners and the
periphery of the store and public signposts to check their phones or talk. These practices
ensured that they were not watched, and that no one mistook them as unoccupied or as being
on the watch. "Watchedness" is stratified across different public locations, peaking near the
centers (monuments/centers of public spaces that attract attention), and depressing near the
peripheries (corners and boundaries of spaces/buildings). Watchedness prompts atomization
by stimulating norms on how to manage our presence, which can only be broken by interaction.
It appears, thus, that we cope with perpetual sense of "watchedness" and surveillance by (1)
remaining mobile (dislocating your presence); (2) appearing occupied (nullifying the attention
of our presence); and (3) seek out the places where watchedness is low (hiding our presence).
Breaking the Blasé: Interaction and Presence
At the east corner of Leicester Square, musicians consistently occupied the space to
perform. Only once was the space occupied by a stand-up comedian. Otherwise, the space was
empty. I witnessed four musicians during my time there, who alternated shifts to perform for
the crowds. Consistently across all of their performances, no one stopped or gathered around
to listen to their music, except for the fourth one, who performed at 7pm—peak hours that
attracted the most tourists and passersby. A couple of people gathered when he started talking,
not singing, to introduce his next song (which was a cover). Only afterwards did people
gradually gather to listen and record his song. By contrast, individuals seated on the stone ledge
(which was behind the musicians) began watching the musicians at the outset of their
performance.
That people only felt comfortable watching others at a distance, even musicians meant
for public watch, implies two levels of engagement we are committed to: watching and
interacting (even with our “presence”). Presence gains credence as an interaction from
observations in the caricature stations, where no one stood to watch the drawing: it presented
too intimate a setting and isolated an experience to allow for comfortable observation without
coming across as an intrusion into private space. Bound up in this second form of engagement,
interaction, then, is a veiled sense of threat that must be nullified prior to engagement. The
precondition for interaction in metropolitan spaces, which is seen by default as a threat or
invasion of personal space, are social cues that nullify this threat. People only gather (who
interact by investing their presence) when others gather because “there's evidence that the threat
of interaction is nullified” (it is safe to stand and watch without being intrusive). To this effect,
the people who first stood and gathered in front of the fourth musician only did so when he cast
an interactive “prompt.”
At the west corner of Leicester Square, different groups of dance performances
occurred every thirty minutes. I witnessed five different dance performances and one magic
show. They acquired more attention than musicians by consistently casting interactive prompts:
using a mic to announce the start of a show and telling told crowd to "come closer," to be louder
("come on guys, this is a high-energy show; if there's no energy, there's no show"), and to be
comfortable ("if you like something, then clap; if you don't like something, then [still] clap").
For one dance, the crowds grew so large and dense that there was no space to see what was
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going on from the back, yet still new people came to the back, attempting to catch a glimpse.
During individual performances, fellow dancers would clap and suggest for the crowd to join
in, eliciting cheers and applause. Dancers often pulled in kids to perform alongside them, and
then finished by soliciting "applause for (name of child)." Before the finale, they often noted
that "Leicester square doesn't pay them, neither does the government; this is our livelihood,
and it helps me pay rent"; "a street performer means we'll do anything for the money, so please,
two pounds, three pounds, ten pounds, a hundred pounds, anything you can give"; and "don't
run away, if you liked the show, then help fill these hats!" Moreover, some dancers approached
targeted members of the crowd with the hats, which usually earned a donation.
Thus, through engaging prompts that both encouraged participation and nullified its
threat and awkwardness for the crowds, the dancers successfully involved adults. Using
children, they attracted donations and involvement by forcing an investment of personal space
from their parents. Directly approaching audience members produced more funds because the
audience members could no longer deny their investment or their interactions: they had stayed
the whole time, and were now publicly recognized for it; from being surrounded by people, we
infer we are being watched, which provides us cognizance of how others are aware of us in the
same capacities we are aware of ourselves: it may be for this reason that audience members
feel compelled to offer money. That people approached a gathering (a sign of interaction)
without knowing its content (the dancing) demonstrates a natural inclination toward
interactions, not atomization. Ultimately, it is the case that we appear blasé (indifferent) more
often than we are blasé.
By Shaftesbury fountain in Piccadilly Circus, a Spiderman-costumed man distributed
flyers—a child ran up to him and asked to take a picture with him. After doing so, the parents
proceeded to talk to the costumed man. Combining the observations of children and the
dancers, it may be inferred that offsetting the atomization implied by the blasé occurs in a
structured process consisted of (a) conveying an interactive prompt, (b) investment of personal
space, (c) receipt of interactive prompt, and (d) establishment of two-way interaction.
Within the public squares, this process was manifested in two key elements: (1) the
presence of children. By approaching people, children became their parents' personal
investment in a social situation. (2) The performative invitations to engagement from public
dancers. The observers, by stopping and standing close to the dance scene, inadvertently
invested themselves in the dance, and became susceptible to further prompts for interaction,
such as clapping along. Moreover, the dancers, by explicitly prompting interaction,
performatively established it.
Discussion
Uncovering the Importance of the Blasé in Modern Life
Unpacking the blasé as the default attitude of indifference in city life, we come to realize
it is more universal, more elusive, and more socially embedded than anticipated. The blasé is
sustained by my (and others') apparent fear of being seen as unoccupied, the need to remain
occupied per the reality of constant surveillance through other occupants of urban spaces. What
results is a forced self-regulation of our performances to circumvent the perceived stigma of
loneliness as undesirable. Yet, penetrable by prompts of interaction, the blasé conceives of
interaction or proximity as a threat to personal space, the fear of which lies not just in being
invaded, but in being seen as an invader by the watching masses natural to city-life. The
precondition for interaction to occur is social cues that nullify this threat. Like with the prompts
initiated by street performers, social cues offer us a moment of social acceptance to interact
without disrupting the balance between solitude and belonging. Thus, as a quality of
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metropolitan city life, the blasé thrives not as an attitude, but as a practice of regulating attitudes
and appearances located within the unity it creates between universal opposites. It thrives in
the balance between co-presence and solitude, making the want to belong contingent on the
want to stand apart. These characteristics, by virtue of their simplicity, are universal in their
own right within a city. By living between their interstices, fashioning unities from opposites,
the blasé lives out of sight, but among us.
Performatively Critiquing the Modern Tenets of Ethnography: The Merits of a
Quotidian Approach
My fieldwork site illustrated the actionization of a quotidian approach, grounded on
impressions that allow access into the meaning-creation processes and social embeddedness of
social relations and settings. Ethnographically, the conditions for membership were met by the
liberality behind its boundaries. Criteria for membership in a city is attributed to residency.
Membership in the social setting relevant to the blasé process only consisted of being a member
of a metropolitan city, that being London, in this case. The questions I raised before data
collection were broad enough to allow for refinement and change: how is the blasé manifested
and operated within a space? What does it say about indifference in metropolitan city life?
Using a quotidian approach, my method first consisted of mass description (Becker, 1998) or
the recording of every detail, for whose significance I could not yet determine without
recursivity and systematicity. Without the intent to answer a general, malleable question, I
reflected on every detail with new theoretical purchase. The awkwardness that I felt by
observing others while sitting alone, warding away others by making eye-contact, and being
absorbed into the participation that performers elicited, were all instances of society being "felt
under my skin." These instances came to me in impressions of awkwardness and commonness,
solitude and belonging, distance and proximity. Being a full member of the space in which I
was studying and without the detachment that theory would have brought, I was rendered naked
and vulnerable to the emotional incision of my experiences. This, in turn, inspires a reevaluation of how my embarrassment on a bench bracketing Leicester square spoke to deeper,
normative discomforts in city life beyond this instance, from the way we are watched to how
we stigmatize loneliness. Indeed, the flexible reach of this sociological analysis would not have
been possible had I allowed theory to prematurely interrupt and restrictively structure my
research design, fieldwork, and analysis with a recursive, systematized, detached (or "nonnative") approach.
A constant comparative method that shuttles between abstract concepts in a
predetermined reality and actual observations from the field would have missed the nuances of
the blasé. A constant comparative method, for instance, would have understood how
individuals gravitated towards spaces of "low-watchedness" as a result of city-design as an
abstract, predefined concept. It would assert that people did so because the entirety of Leicester
Square and Piccadilly Circus themselves were designed this way—to manipulate people’s
psychology and influence where they would go (Whyte, 1980). However, building
generalizations to introduce an entire school of thought—the psychology of city-design—limits
and threatens sociological insight. Repackaging my observations in terms of the psychology of
city-design forecloses engagement with why and how atomization and indifference exist and
operate as universal characteristics of metropolitan city life by treating this phenomenon as a
priori quality. Returning to the restaurant analogy, asking how and why diners use forks in a
restaurant can inspire a sociological evaluation of the fork as a part of restaurant life, but not if
the practice is prematurely attributed to the obvious fact that the restaurant had provided the
fork on the table in the first place. Deductively proceeding from generalizations of city-design
during data collection would have led me into a search for further characteristics in the
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psychology of city-design. Per the practice of constant comparative analysis, I inevitably would
have neglected "irrelevant," but otherwise important details and forcibly extracted
interpretations from existing details to invite more thought inspired by city-design. In sum,
rigidly defined standards allow things beyond their scope to escape, culminating in an
insensitivity to empirical details (Adorno, 2000/1968, p. 84).
Similarly, writing and relationality play into this process. My study of practices of
atomization and indifference within Leicester Square and Piccadilly Circus would lack
theoretical purchase if framed as a study of these two places alone. From performing dancers
successfully inviting passersby to stay and watch, the absence of watchers for performing
singers, who did not invite interaction from passersby, the aversion of eye-contact or other
indicators of interaction with passing strangers, I uncovered principles in the social scripts that
extended beyond Leicester Square and Piccadilly Circus. These scripts helped to unearth how
mobility in non-places work, or places whose primary function is passage into other places
(Auge, 1992). We can analyze the values and rules espoused in these social scripts to create
inferences about metropolitan city life itself. That the precondition for interaction to occur is
social cues that nullify this threat, moreover, speaks to the social life of cities—including other
places—more than that of simply non-places. In this case, the blasé or indifference is our
default public attitude in cities, thick enough to resist interaction with strangers, but penetrable
by prompts for interaction.
Moving Beyond Systematicity, Rigidification, and Complexification in Modern
Ethnography
The themes across the above methodological discussions, driven by a fundamentally
negative position, shed light on the ideals with which Adorno held within qualitative methods,
and on which grounds he lambasted quantitative approaches. For Adorno, non-identity, fluid
thinking must respect the context of research enough to adopt not only an open approach to the
selection of methods, but an unfixed approach to how we collect and process data within our
chosen methods. In replying to the reproach that he offered "no binding rules of behaviour for
sociological cognition," Adorno et al once wrote "he who wishes to nestle up to the structure
of his object and thinks of it as something in itself moving does not have at his disposal a mode
of procedure independent of it" (Adorno et al., 1976, p. 48). Ethnography and participant
observation have their merits as sensitizing devices to the need for an inductive approach to
empirical research and analysis. However, contemporary emphases on systematicity and
recursivity ultimately overshadow any such effort with deductive theoretical irruptions “from
without” that bias data collection and foreclose alternate possibilities of understanding
materials. In so doing, they fail to place theory in dialogue with itself to decrypt phenomena
with the proximity and closeness of being within. Moreover, understanding social reality,
Adorno asserts, prescribes the need "to balance the demand for empirical investigation with the
requirement that the result be meaningful" in a "planned but unsystematic way" (Adorno, 1958,
p. 67). At the same time, the possibility of a step-by-step approach to sociology is to be rejected
(Adorno, 2000/1968, p. 5), borne out of a denial of any final determination of sociology as a
discipline and its concept of society (Adorno, 2000/1968, pp. 28–29, 103).
For Adorno, an illuminating example of a planned, though unsystematic, strategy
through which social phenomena can be better understood from the inside was Kracauer’s
(1998/1930) study of white-collar workers (see Benzer, 2011, p. 57). Kracauer readjusted his
observations depending on the phenomena under study, circumventing systematicity without
losing order. To this end, he conducted research in a planned, but unsystematic way. He used
interviews, but without standardized schemata, to flexibly draw closer to the "conversational
situation" and adapt his approach to the phenomena. In this manner, he obtained proximity to
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the phenomena to understand the context in its own terms without misrepresenting it by
subsuming it into an abstract theory.
Mainstream ethnographic and qualitative research appear congruous with the interests
of sociological analysis by offering proximity and immediacy to the site of a social
phenomenon and environment (Benzer, 2011, p. 77). But their current tendencies towards
systematicity, rigidification, and complexification rigidly break down social phenomena in
predetermined ways—labeled interpretation—and rigidly build them back up in hierarchical
narratives—labeled presentation. Doing so over-complexifies social reality to the effect of
distorting and misrepresenting it. As such, ethnographic research and writing require guidance
away from reifying roles and social settings, and method-driven research. We must move
towards a new approach that can access the immediacy of quotidian encounters; an approach
predicated on feeling impressions as units of analysis. Impressions help to access social
embeddedness, formulate theoretical thinking above conceptual thinking, thinking from within
rather than from without, and context-driven research—all of which fluidly combine in our
research like they do in the research field as a situated part of a larger society.
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